

Algorithms in lattice-based cryptography


June 5, 2025

Overview

- Lattices
- Good and bad lattice bases
- Algorithmic problems
- Relevance in cryptography


Lattices

- Lattice: $L = \{s_1b_1 + \dots + s_nb_n \mid s_i \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ where $b_1, \dots, b_n$ is a basis of $\mathbb{R}^n$.




Lattices

- Infinitely many bases




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
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
Lattices

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
Bad and good lattice bases

- A bad base




Bad and good lattice bases

- $u \leftarrow u + v$




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
Bad and good lattice bases

- $v \leftarrow v - 3u$




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
Bad and good lattice bases



The orthogonality-defect


- A constant describing how orthogonal a basis is

- $$\delta(b_1, \dots, b_n) = \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{\|b_i\|}{\|b_i^*\|}$$



SVP

- Given a basis $b_1, \dots, b_n$ of the lattice L , find $x \in L \setminus \{0\}$ s.t. $\|x\|$ is minimal



SVP (Shortest Vector Problem)

- Using enumeration SVP can be solved in $3^n \delta(b_1, \dots, b_n)$ time and polynomial space.

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- Running time $n^{O(n)}$, this is currently the best among polynomial space algorithms


Open questions

- There are $2^{O(n)}$ time and space algorithms
- Hard open question: Is there $2^{O(n)}$ time and polynomial space algorithm?

The Voronoi-cell and the covering radius

- Voronoi cell of lattice L :


$$V(L) = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid \forall y \in L: d(x, 0) \leq d(x, y)\}$$



The Voronoi-cell and the covering radius


- Covering radius of L :

$$\mu(L) = \sup_{x \in V(L)} \|x\|$$



CVP (Closest Vector Problem)

- Given a basis $b_1, \dots, b_n$ of a lattice L and a target vector $t \in \mathbb{R}^n$, find $x \in L$ closest to t .



An other constant

- An other way of measuring how good a basis is:

$$\mu(b_1, \dots, b_n) = \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{2^{\mu(L_i)}}{\|b_i^*\|}$$

where L_i is the lattice spanned by $b_1, \dots, b_i$.

- CVP can be solved using enumeration in time $2^n \mu(b_1, \dots, b_n)$
- By reduction on the dual lattice, one can achieve $\mu(b_1, \dots, b_n) \leq n!$ (using heuristics one can get $\leq n^{n/2}$)

My observations

- One can use an approximation version of the dual basis reduction: this gives a faster running time for reduction, and slower running time for enumeration
- One can bound the running time of SVP using a slightly different constant:

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n-1} \frac{2\mu(L_i)}{\|b_{i+1}^*\|}$$

which has a different geometric meaning

Importance in cryptography

- Average-case problems $\leftarrow$ worst-case hard problems
- (Assumed to be) safe against quantum attacks (Shor's quantum algorithm breaks RSA)
- Modern crypto builds on these and similar lattice problems